Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of out of State Witnesses in Criminal Cases-Process-Extradition-Privileges and Immunities-Due Process by Cohon, George A.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 51
Issue 1 May-June Article 8
Summer 1960
Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of out of
State Witnesses in Criminal Cases-Process-
Extradition-Privileges and Immunities-Due Process
George A. Cohon
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
George A. Cohon, Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of out of State Witnesses in Criminal Cases-Process-Extradition-Privileges
and Immunities-Due Process, 51 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 72 (1960-1961)
CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS AND ABSTRACTS
Such a formula would seem to combine the objec-
tive and subjective approaches to produce a result
which is both reasonable and equitable.
A brief summary of the application of this
analysis to several situations may be helpful in
testing its validity. In the first situation to be
considered, the crime is continuing on the basis of
application of an objective standard, and the
defendant enters with intent to aid in its comple-
tion. However, if intent is not clear, then the
rebuttable presumption of intent is raised. This
situation is, of course, the one involved in the
Zierlion case, and the reader will recall that here
the late joiner should be guilty as a principal.
The second illustration is the Baker case in
which the defendant entered before the crime was
completed but with intent only to aid the criminal
to escape. An application of an objective analysis
would raise a presumption of intent which could
be rebutted. If rebutted, the joiner could be
convicted neither as a principal nor as an accessory
to the major crime. Prosecution as a principal
would be ineffective because the necessary intent
to aid the major crime is not present; and pros-
ecution as an accessory would be equally ineffec-
tive since the activities of the defendant took
place before the crime was consummated.
46
46 Of what crime, then, could Baker have been
convicted? It has been suggested that conviction could
be sought on the basis of the theory that this individual
was an accessory to a lesser crime included in the greater
crime of manslaughter, i.e., accessory after the fact of
assault with intent to murder. Comment, 32 MrNN. L.
REv. 502 (1948). Such a conviction was upheld in
People v. Haskins, 337 Ill. 131, 169 N.E. 18 (1929).
Thus, in the final analysis Baker would be punished to
the same extent to which he would have been, had he
been determined an accessory after the fact of murder.
The third example is a case in which the crime
is found to have been completed on the basis of
objective analysis, but the joiner enters with
intent to aid in the major crime. Since the formula
developed requires a concurrence of the objective
and subjective factors, the defendant in this
situation would be guilty as an accessory.47
The final possibility relates to a case in which
the crime is complete and the intent of the joiner
is to aid the principal in escape. Here, the pre-
sumption formula is inapplicable since it is clearly
the situation contemplated by accessory after
the fact statutes.
This suggests a question as to whether, contrary to
present legislation, a different punishment should be
statutorily prescribed for accessories after the fact of
different crimes. Such a distinction would involve the
problem of attempting to draw fine lines in relation to
punishment. For example, the punishment in Illinois
for an accessory after the fact is ". . . imprisonment in
the penitentiary for a term of not less than one year
and not exceeding two years, and fined not exceeding
$5002' IL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 38, §584 (1959). The judge
or jury could, as they now do, set the punishment
within the statute to fit their concept of the seriousness
of the offense. This would seem preferable to an in-
flexible statutory amendment.
An additional legislative solution has been advanced
in relation to establishment of a new class of crime to
cover situations such as the Baker case. Comment,
32 MnN. L. REv. 502 (1948). It would be more de-
sirable, however, to convict as an accessory after the
fact and set the punishment to suit the crime within
the statutory limits. Possibly, the penalty for such a
violation should be more severe than presently pro-
vided in accessory after the fact statutes, but this is a
moral rather than a legal determination. In addition,
such situations seem to arise so infrequently that ad-
ditional legislation may not be justified.
47As previously indicated this is consistent with the
legal requirement of some participation in the major
crime. Note 38, supra.
CASE NOTE
UNIFORM ACT TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF OUT OF STATE WITNESSES
IN CRIMINAL CASES-PROCESS-EXTRADITION-PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES-DUE PROCESS. New York v. O'Neil, 359 U.S. 1 (1959)
GEORGE A. COHON
Forty-three states have adopted statutes which enforcement of the criminal law by facilitating
provide a procedure to secure the attendance at the administration of criminal proceedings.
5
criminal proceedings of witnesses from without
a state.' The purpose of these statutes is to promote CoL. REv. STAT. ANN. §39-6-1 (1953); CONN. GEN.
STAT. REv. §54-22 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
1 ARiz. R v. STAT. ANN. §13-1861 (1956); APK. STAT. §3521 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. §942.01 (1944); IDAHO
ANN. §43-2005 (1947); CAL. PEN. CODE. §1334 (1956); CODE ANN. §19-3005 (1948); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38
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Generally, these statutes are patterned after the
model act drafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.3
The Uniform Act provides for the following
procedure: A certificate is filed by a judge in the
requesting state with a judge in the state where
the witness may be found. The certificate must
show that a criminal prosecution is pending in
the requesting state or that a grand jury investi-
gation has commenced, or is about to commence,
and that the person sought is a material witness.
In addition the certificate must state the number
of days the witness' presence will be required.
If the judge with whom the petition is filed finds
that the certificate is proper, he may order the
witness before him in one of two ways:
1.) He may set a time and a place for a hearing
and order the witness to appear. After the
hearing, a summons may be issued directing
the witness to attend and testify in the out-
of-state proceeding.
2.) He may direct that the witness be im-
mediately brought before him for a hearing.
After the hearing the judge may order that
the witness be taken into custody and
delivered to an officer of the requesting state.
§690.1 (1959); IND. ANN. STAT. §9-1626 (1956); KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §62-2801 (Supp. 1959); Ky. REv. STAT.
§421.230 (1959); LA. REV. STAT. §15.152.1 (1950);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 148, §24 (1954); MD. ANN.
CODE. art. 27 §617 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233
§13 (a) (1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. §634.06 (1947);
MISS. CODE. ANN. §1892 (1942); MONT. REv. CODES
ANN. §94-9001 (1947); NEB. REv. STAT. §29-1906
(1956); NEv. REv. STAT. §178.295 (1959); N. H. REv.
STAT. ANN. §613.1 (1955); N. J. STAT. ANN §2A: 81-18
(1952); N. M. STAT. ANN. §41-12-13 (1953); N. Y.
CODE CRIr. PRoc. §618 (a) (1958); N. C. GEN. STAT.
§8-65 (1953); N. D. REv. CODE §31-0325 (1943);
Omo REv. CODE ANN. §2939.26 (Baldwin 1959);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §721 (Supp. 1959); ORE. REv.
STAT. §139.210 (1959); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 §622.1
(Supp. 1958); P. R. LAws ANN. tit. 34, §1471 (1956);
R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §12-16-1 (1956); S. C. CODE
§26-301 (1952); S. D. CODE § 34.2501 (1939); TENN.
CODE. ANN. §40-2429 (1955); TEX. CODE Clne. PROC.
ANN. art. 486a (1954); UTAH CODE ANN. §77-45-11
(1953); VT. STAT. ANN tit. 13, §6641 (1958); VA.
CODE ANN. §19-242 (1950); WASH. REv. CODE
§10.55.010 (1956); W. VA. CODE ANN. §6246(1)
(1955); Wis. STAT. ANN. §325.33 (1959); Wyo. Comp.
STAT. ANN. §7-250 (1957).
2 Comment, 31 MiN. L. REv. 699 (1947); Comment,
8 U. CmI. L. REv. 567 (1941); Comment, 41 MICH. L.
REv. 171 (1942); Comment, 10 W. REs. L. REv. 611
(1959); Comment 107 U. PA. L. REv. 275 (1958). Also,
the Uniform Act may stop bribes by organized crime
to potential witnesses, Comment 85 U. PA. L. REv. 717
(1937). Many guilty persons will escape unless there is
power like that found in the Uniform Act. Comment,
10 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 345 (1942). Also see, Comment,
43 MINN. L. REv. 1005 (1959); Comment, 37 N.C.L.
REv. 77 (1958); Comment, 33 TuL. L. REv. 874 (1959).
This procedure is followed, when recom-
mended by the requesting state, so as to assure
the witness' attendance in that state.
Under either procedure, the hearing and issues
to be determined are the same.
The judge must determine whether the witness
is material and necessary to the criminal proceed-
ing, whether his attendance will cause him undue
hardship, and whether the requesting state, and
any state through which the witness will travel,
will grant him immunity from arrest and the service
of civil and criminal process.
4
In April of 1956, there was filed in the Circuit
Court of Dade County, Florida, a certificate
pursuant to the requirements of the Florida
statute.5 The requesting certificate was executed
by a judge of the New York Court of General
Sessions, seeking to require the attendance of one
'UNIFOR LAW TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF
WINEssEs YROM WITHor A STATE IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS §§1-9.
4 The state courts are not in agreement as to what
standards should be employed to determine the ma-
teriality of any given witness. In In re Cooper, 127
N J.L. 312, 22 A.2d 532 (1941), the court pointed out
that under the Act, the certificate of a judge of the
requesting state is "prima facie evidence of all facts
stated therein." The court held that the question of
materiality of the witness is largely a decision for the
court in which the cause is being tried, since the de-
termination depends somewhat upon the laws of that
jurisdiction and the evidence adduced on the trial of
the issue. Other courts have held that more is needed
before a witness' testimony can be considered material.
See State v. Fouquette, 67 Nev. 505, 221 P.2d 404
(1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 932 (1951); In re Mayers,
9 Misc. 2d 212, 169 N.Y.S.2d 839 (1957); Application
of Stamler, 279 App. Div. 908, 111 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1952).
The provisions in most of the acts are identical
although some now provide for bail. See 10 W. RES.
L. REv. 611 (1959), 34 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 175 (1957).
The statute also provides that the witness will be
paid ten cents a mile to and from the court where the
prosecution is pending, and five dollars a day for each
day he is required to travel and serve as a witness.
The requesting state is obligated to pay the witness,
provided he is a witness for the state. This provision
of the Uniform Act does not entitle a defendant to have
witnesses brought into court at public expense. State
v. Blount, 200 Or. 35, 264 P.2d 419 (1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 962 (1954); State ex ret Butler v. Swensen, 243
Minn. 24, 66 N.W.2d 1 (1954); Vore v. State, 158
Neb. 222, 63 N.W.2d 141 (1954); State v. Fouquette,
67 Nev. 505, 221 P.2d 404 (1950), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 932 (1951). See; State v. Bean, 181 Kan. 1044,
317 P.2d 480 (1957) in which the Supreme Court of
Kansas held that the provisions of the Uniform Act are
not mandatory and need not be followed where a
witness who lives in another state agrees voluntarily to
return to the place of trial, and where the county
attorney arranged for the voluntary attendance of the
witness by advancing necessary funds for his transpor-
tation and expenses in lieu of invoking provisions of the
Uniform Act.5 FLA. STAT. ANN. §942.01 (1936).
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O'Neill as a witness before a New York grand
jury.
O'Neill, a resident of the State of Illinois, was
attending a convention in the State of Florida.'
The certificate recommended that O'Neill be
taken into immediate custody and delivered to an
officer of the State of New York. Upon hearing
this petition, the Florida Circuit Court ruled that
the Florida statute violated both the Florida and
the United States Constitutions and refused to
grant the New York requestY
The Supreme Court of Florida, affirming this
decision,8 relied upon the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neffp and
found that the effect of a Florida summons issued
at the request of New York would be to extend
New York's jurisdiction beyond its territorial
limits. In the Pennoyer case, the Court held that
the acquisition of personal jurisdiction through
service of process outside of a state's borders is
invalid.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United
States, with two justices dissenting, reversed the
Florida Supreme Court, and granted New York's
request.10
The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, held that:
"[Tihe Florida courts had immediate personal
jurisdiction over respondent by virtue of his
presence within that State. Insofar as the
Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, this
gave the Florida courts constitutional jurisdic-
tion to order an act even though that act is to be
performed outside of the State."" (Emphasis
added).
The presence of O'Neill in Florida is all that the
Court would require to give the Florida courts
personal jurisdiction over O'Neill, which includes
the power to compel him to appear as a witness
in another state.
In Pennoyer v. Neff, a state court attempted to
exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
party. A different situation is presented by the
Uniform Act than is found in Pennoyer. Under the
Uniform Act, a state is requiring a party to perform
acts outside of its boundaries only after the state
6 O'Neill could not be reached in Illinois since at that
time Illinois did not have an Act.
79 Fla. Supp. 153 (1956).
1 100 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1958).
9 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
10 359 U.S. 1 (1959). Justices Douglas and Black
dissented.
n1 See supra note 10, at 8.
has acquired personal jurisdiction of the party by
reason of his presence within the state. The re-
questing state, New York, exercises no extra-
territorial jurisdiction, for it only requests Florida's
action. New York does not attempt to serve the
witness with its own process.
2
The majority and the dissenting opinions in the
O'Neill case disagreed as to whether the states
have the power to enact uniform legislation to
secure the attendance of out of state witnesses.
The majority opinion held that:
"Unless there is some provision in the United
States Constitution which clearly prevents
States from accomplishing this end by the
means chosen, this Court must sustain the
Uniform Act.... It is within the unrestricted
area of action left to the States by the
Constitution." 1'
Thus, the majority opinion reasoned that silence
in the Constitution does not preclude state action.
The dissenting opinion, however, bases its
reasoning upon the Extradition Clause of the
Constitution. 4 They claim that a state cannot
expand its power of extradition to cover witnesses
when the scope of such power is specifically
limited to fugitives."'
The dissent further argues that Congress has
preempted the area of extradition since it has
enacted legislation making it a federal crime for a
person to move in interstate commerce "to avoid
giving testimony" in certain felony proceedings. 6
Basing their reasoning upon the supremacy clause
they conclude that, should the power of extradi-
tion be expanded to include witnesses, additional
Congressional action would be needed.
Congress, however, has not enacted a statute
authorizing the extradition of a person charged
"Restatement, Conflict of Laws, §94 (1934). "A
state can exercise jurisdiction through its courts to
make a decree directing a party subject to the juris-
diction of the court to do an act in another state,
provided such act is not contrary to the law of the
state in which it is to be performed." Contra, 72 C.J.S.
Process §8 (1951), 4 Am. JuR. Arrest §19 (1936). Passet
v. Chase, 91 Fla. 522, 107 So. 689 (1926).
3 See supra note 10, at 5.
4 See supra note 10, at 14.
'5 U.S. CONST. art. IV, §2. "A person charged in any
State with Treason, Felony, or other crime, who shall
flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall
on Demand of the executive Authority of the State
from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to
the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime."
'6 Flight to Avoid Prosecution or Giving Testimony,
18 U.S.C. §1073 (1948). New York Central R.R. v.




with a crime who was not present in the charging
state when the crime was committed. To cover
this area, forty-one states have enacted the
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.17 Various state
courts have held the Act constitutional as within
the reserved powers of the states and as an act of
comity with sister states. 8
Congress also has not provided a procedure
whereby a state may request the attendance of
an out-of-state witness. By analogy to the Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act, the states through the
exercise of their reserved powers may provide a
procedure for the surrender of witnesses to other
states whenever they are necessary for the success-
ful enforcement of criminal law.
The apparent logic of this argument might fail
when the soundness of comparing a witness with
one charged with a crime is questioned. The Uni-
form Criminal Extradition Act merely expands
the existing constitutional provision for the extra-
dition of persons charged with a crime. The Uni-
form Act to Secure Attendance of Witnesses,
however, expands the states' powers of extradition
to include not only persons accused of a crime
but also the witnesses needed to prosecute such
accused persons. Where the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act is based upon the extradition
clause of the constitution, there is no constitutional
provision which provides for the extradition of
witnesses. This dilemma is resolved in that the
Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses
is based on the reserved powers of the states rather
than on the extradition clause of the constitution.
The interpretation of the "Privileges and Im-
munities" clause was also involved in the O'Neill
17 UuiroaR CRnAL ExmADrioN AcT §§1-31.
IsEnnist v. Baden, 6 Fla. Supp. 183, 28 So. 2d 160
(1946); State v. Kriss, 191 Md. 568, 62 A.2d 568 (1948);
Ex parte Bledsoe, 93 Okla. Crim. 302, 227 P.2d 680
(1951). 22 Am. JuR. 250, Extraditiom, §9. Accord,
UN oR REc RocA ENhrOcxmEXNT or SuI'pORT
AcT, §§1-33. Despite the fact that Section 5 of said
Act authorizes the surrender of a non-fugitive, it has
been upheld as an exercise of the States reserved
sovereign powers and as an act of comity to a sister
State. See, State v. Bennett, 90 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1956);
Harrison v. State, 262 Ala. 701, 77 So. 2d 387 (1955);
Ex parte Coleman, 157 Tex. Crim. 37, 245 S.W.2d 712
(1951).
Each of the several states has the sovereign power
to provide for their own internal safety and to promote
concord and harmony among themselves by mutually
supporting each other in bringing offenders to justice.
Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66 (1860). See also:
In re Saperstein, 30 N. J. Super. 373, 104 A.2d 842
(1959) where 4 U.S.C. §111 (1956) is cited which pro-
vides that "the consent of Congress is hereby given to
any two or more States to enter into agreements or
case.19 The privilege or immunity asserted by
O'Neill was the right of free ingress and egress
among the states. This clause was intended to
prevent discrimination by a state against the
constitutional rights of the citizens of other states.2 l
The Court found that the Uniform Act does not
discriminate between the citizens of one state and
those of other states found within its borders, but
applies to all persons alike.21 Justices Black and
Douglas, dissenting, claimed that the right of
freedom of movement was violated by the statute.
They fail, however, to explain how such freedom
was violated.
Although the O'Neill case dealt primarily with
the constitutionality of the Uniform Act, applica-
tion of the Act also presents non-constitutional
questions of policy and interpretation.
The advantages of the Act can only be main-
tained when its procedural requirements are
strictly followed. The most important requirements
of the Act are that the witness is material and
necessary, that his attendance will not cause him
undue hardship, and that states to which or
through which he travels will grant him immunity
from arrest or service of process. The immunity
requirement does not raise severe problems. The
other requirements, however, cause more difficulty.
For example:
(1) Suppose that a request is made by an
Illinois court upon an Indiana court requesting
the procurement of a key witness for an Illinois
murder prosecution. Provided that the court is
satisfied with the requirements of maeriality
and necessity,n it must also decide that the
attendance of the witness will not cause him
undue hardship. The court may satisfy this
requirement by a careful examination of the
nature of the pending prosecution and the
amount of hardship placed on the individual
witness. In a situation similar to the hypo-
thetical, the court might find, and rightly so,
compacts for cooperative effort and mutual assistance
in the prevention of crime and in the enforcement of
their respective criminal laws and policies, and to
establish such agencies, joint or otherwise, as they may
deem desirable for making effective such agreements
and compacts."19 U.S. CoNsT. art IV, §2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
20 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Hague
v. C. I. 0., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Cf. Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168
(1868); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. 418 (1870); U.S. v.
Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920).
21 See supra note 10, at 6.
22 See supra note 4 for discussion of problems in-
volved in determining "materiality and necessity".
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